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This paper defends the idea that the only feasible and desirable
alternative to bourgeois democracy in 1918 Germany was a parlia-
mentary democracy supported by workers’ councils. This alternative,
which I will call council Erfurtianism, blazed a trail of political possi-
bility from late November 1918 to the summer of 1920 that was emi-
nently desirable and politically accessible to the German revolutionary
left. Council Erfurtianism was consistently undermined by the lead-
ership of the majority social democrats, with some help from the far
left. A mixture of sectarianism and mistrust made revolutionary com-
promise impossible and elevated the ‘parliament vs. councils’ polarity
from a secondary strategic issue, into a supreme question of (putative)
principle. That sectarianism also accounted for two failed attempts to
rekindle the revolutionary fire: the pro-socialisation strikes of March
1919 and the strike that ended the Kapp putsch, one year later.
∗Forthcoming in Socialist History. Thanks to Ralf Hoffrogge and Francis King for
helpful written comments.
†Political Science, Leiden University and Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus
University; n.vrousalis@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
1
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379858 
The German revolution of November 1918 promised a double liberation:
from the shackles of Prussian militarism, on the one hand, and from those
material buttresses of militarism, the ‘great German industrialists’, on the
other. The revolution, in other words, promised communism, that tiny item
insinuated into the agenda of world history by the October revolution.
Communism, in general, is the extension of democratic self-government
to every area of social life, especially the economy. The signal contribution
of the German revolution was the invention of a strategy uniquely suited
to the transition towards communism. Variously called ‘revolutionary re-
formism’ or ‘revolutionary social democracy’, the strategy is more aptly
called council Erfurtianism. It is summed up in the thesis that the only
feasible and desirable alternative to bourgeois democracy in 1918 Germany
was a parliamentary democracy supported by workers’ councils. ‘Erfurtian-
ism’, because it was based on the democratic-parliamentary traditions of
the Erfurt Programme—the ideological centrepiece of pre-war German social
democracy—and ‘council Erfurtianism’, because it advocated worker control
of industry through the councils forged during the revolution of 1918.
This essay offers a defence of council Erfurtianism. It argues for three
claims. First, council Erfurtianism charted a trail of political possibility
from late November 1918 to the summer of 1920 that was eminently desir-
able and politically accessible to the German revolutionary left. Indeed, as
the first few weeks of the revolution demonstrated, it was the only revolu-
tionary strategy with some chance of success. Second, the commitment to
council Erfurtianism was shared by the revolution’s centre as well as by some
on the left. Third, council Erfurtianism was consistently undermined by the
leadership of the majority social democrats, with some help from the far left.
A mixture of sectarianism and mistrust made revolutionary compromise im-
possible and elevated the ‘parliament vs. councils’ polarity from a secondary
strategic issue, into a supreme question of (putative) principle. That sectar-
ianism also accounted for two failed attempts to rekindle the revolutionary
fire: the pro-socialisation strikes of March 1919 and the magisterial strike
that ended the Kapp putsch, one year later.
1 Background
The centrepiece of the early politics of the Social Democratic Party of Ger-
many (SPD), up until the onset of World War I, was its 1891 Erfurt Pro-
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gramme.1 Vigorously elaborated by Karl Kautsky, ‘the pope of Marxism’,
the programme advocated the conquest of state power through parliamen-
tary and trade union struggle. It agitated for the full panoply of democratic
liberties, and for proportional representation, biennial parliaments, the uni-
versal election of civil servants, secular and free general education, a national
militia, and an eight-hour working day.
The First World War shattered the organizational unity of German social
democracy: in April 1917, the SPD split over the extension of war credits,
which led to a left split, and the creation of the USPD (Independent Social
Democratic Party). Despite this, the Erfurt Programme continued to shape
the strategic vision of both parties. According to that vision, the dictatorship
of the proletariat meant preservation and extension of democratic rights into
the economy, beyond the limits circumscribed by capitalist rule over market
and workplace. It was only after the Bolsheviks had taken power in Russia
in November 1917 that some left factions of the USPD began to question the
main tenets of Erfurtianism, agitating for socialist revolution on the Russian
model.
Egalitarian, ephemeral, mercurial, introverted, and vigorously militant,
the USPD encompassed a wide range of currents of the German revolutionary
left.2 The party’s main shop-floor organisation was the Berlin shop stewards.
This was a group of radical metalworkers, led by Richard Müller and Ernst
Däumig. The shop stewards were largely responsible for the mass strikes
against Karl Liebknecht’s imprisonment in 1916, against food rationing in
1917, and against the war in January 1918. In establishing the strike com-
mittees of early 1918, the shop stewards also laid the foundation for what
was to become, in November 1918, the Executive Council (Vollzugrat) of the
Berlin workers’ and soldiers’ councils.
The German revolution was sparked by spontaneous synergy between
these revolutionary workers and radicalised soldiers. Following the Kiel
sailors’ mutiny of 3 November, workers’ and soldiers’ councils began spread-
ing all over Germany; railways carried the revolutionary fire to every corner
of the country. On 7 November, Kurt Eisner, the leader of the Bavarian
1See A.J. Ryder. The German Revolution of 1918 (Cambridge,
1967), chapter 1. The Erfurt programme is available online here:
https://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1891/erfurt-program.htm
2 The most comprehensive history of the mercurial six-year career of the USPD is David
W. Morgan, The Socialist Left and the German Revolution: A History of the German
Independent Social Democratic Party, 1917-1922 (London, 1975).
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USPD, seized power in Munich, putting an end to the hundred-year reign of
the Bavarian kings and the eight-hundred-year reign of the Wittelsbach dy-
nasty. After the Kaiser’s abdication on 9 November, power fell into the hands
of the Berlin Executive Council. Max von Baden, the interim Chancellor,
anointed Friedrich Ebert, the SPD leader, new Reich Chancellor.
2 The Erfurtian moment
The main tenets of Erfurtianism animated the November revolution; indeed,
when coupled with the idea of workers’ control of industry, they potentially
provided a basis for its lasting victory. The Erfurtian spirit of the revolution
can be illustrated by three pivotal events that occurred during its early days.
On 9 November 1918, the soldiers and workers became de facto rulers
of Germany. They had put an end to the world war, they controlled the
guns and factories of the world’s most industrialised economy, they carried
the aspirations of social democracy. All power had passed to the work-
ers’ and soldiers’ councils. Against this background, the revolution’s first
Erfurtian moment was the spontaneous decision to delegate executive au-
thority to a Provisional Government of Peoples’ Representatives. On 10
November, about 3,000 workers and soldiers from Greater Berlin gathered
at Circus Busch, in the centre of Berlin, to decide the future of the revo-
lution. They set themselves two tasks: to smash Junker militarism and to
socialise the economy. The anti-militarism task meant doing away with the
imperial High Command—Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Groener, and their ilk—
while establishing democratic control over the army. The socialisation task
meant dispossessing the great industrialists—Hugenberg, Stinnes, Siemens,
Thyssen—while extending worker control to every nook and cranny of the
economy.
Significantly, the Circus Busch meeting advanced one means for the
achievement of these ends: socialist unity.3 This was shorthand for the
democratic-parliamentarian traditions of the Erfurt programme. It followed
that the relationship between democracy and communism was not an instru-
mental, eggs-to-omelette affair. Rather, the November revolution aimed at
the extension of democratic ends—essentially, worker control of the economy—
by Erfurtian means.
3 Broué. The German Revolution, 1917-1923. (London, Haymarket Books, 2006),
pp.151-3.
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The Circus Busch delegates appointed an Executive Council, led by Richard
Müller, composed of fourteen workers and fourteen soldiers. They also ap-
pointed a Provisional Government, led by Ebert, composed of three SPD
and three USPD members. One of them, Barth, represented the USPD
Left; Dittmann and Haase represented the USPD Right. The meeting af-
firmed that all political power lay with workers’ and soldiers’ councils and
expressed a commitment to rapid socialization of industry. At the same time,
however, Germany was under siege; its straggling army was barely holding
together; its enemies were demanding annexations and indemnities; its pop-
ulation was on the verge of starvation. Adding to the uncertainty, there was
a crisis in revolutionary authority: who controlled the state administration,
the police, and the army? The Berlin Executive, despite temporarily possess-
ing sovereign power, possessed neither de jure nor de facto authority beyond
Greater Berlin. It followed that an all-German congress of councils would
have to replace it. The date for the Congress was set to 16 December.
The period between November 1918 and January 1919 saw a tug-of-
war between the Provisional Government and the Berlin Executive Council.
Germany’s experience of ‘dual power’ conjured images, indeed memories, of
Kerensky’s Provisional Government in Russia, the July days, and October
1917. But Ebert differed from Kerensky like prose from poetry. Although
Ebert’s government was officially subordinate to the Council, he had already
reappointed the officials of the German ancien regime to their posts; he was
also in the process of reconciling with militarism. This led to constant con-
flict with the Berlin Executive. The temporary agreement of 23 November,4
confirmed the Council’s right to appoint and remove cabinet ministers, but
denied it the right to interfere with the everyday running of government.
To make things worse, the Council was constantly snowed under mountains
of paperwork; this allowed Ebert to squeeze out discretionary powers, all
the while sapping the Council’s influence. As the social democrat Hermann
Müller put it: ‘An organism which has the ambition to go down in history on
the same level as the Committee of Public Safety in the great French Revo-
lution must take care not to become a section of the labour department’.5
The revolution’s second Erfurtian moment was the USPD’s decision to
support the election of a Constituent Assembly. On 11 December 1918, the
4 Broué. The German Revolution, pp.181-3.
5 Broué. The German Revolution, p.174. By this humorous remark, Müller cast asper-
sions on the future of the Berlin Executive as the leading agent of the revolution.
5
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379858 
USPD Left—the Spartacists and the shop stewards—declared that power had
slipped out of the hands of the Executive Council; Rosa Luxemburg called
it the ‘sarcophagus of the revolution’.6 Her metaphor resonated with the
nickname given to the shop-steward leader Richard Müller by the bourgeois
press; they called him Leichen-Müller (literally: Corpse-Müller), following
his pledge that a Constituent Assembly would pass over his dead body. On
the eve of the council Congress, the USPD held a meeting of its members in
Berlin. Luxemburg spoke for the Spartacists. Wanting to forestall support
for a Constituent Assembly and to challenge the USPD leadership, she argued
for a party congress. Her motion was defeated 485 votes to 185. The USPD
began preparing for national elections.
The revolution’s decisive Erfurtian moment transpired the next day, 16
December, when the Congress of workers’ and soldiers’ councils met in Berlin.
It assembled 489 delegates, elected by workers’ and soldiers’ in the pre-war
electoral districts. 405 of the delegates were workers, 84 were soldiers. Ac-
cording to the historian Pierre Broué, there were 179 factory and office work-
ers, 71 intellectuals and 164 professionals, including union members.7 The
SPD had about 288 delegates and the USPD 90, including 10 Spartacists,
but excluding Luxemburg and Liebknecht. The Congress made two major
decisions: first, to elect a Constituent Assembly and, second, to democra-
tise the army. It also reaffirmed a commitment to swift socialisation of the
economy under worker control.
The SPD motion for a Constituent Assembly was passed by 400 votes to
50; Däumig’s motion against it was defeated by 344 votes to 98. The decision
to democratise the army, however, received unanimous support. It was elab-
orated in the Hamburg points, introduced by Walther Lamp’l, the chairman
of the Hamburg soldiers’ council. Lamp’l demanded complete subordination
of the Army High Command to government and councils; abolition of all
badges of rank; delegation of matters of military discipline to the soldiers’
councils; officer elections; and replacement of the standing army by a popular
militia. Before closing, the Congress decided to replace the Berlin Executive
Council by a Central Council (Zentralrat), now representing councils all over
Germany. On this issue, the government carried an amendment, which de-
nied the Central Council veto power over government policy. In response,
Müller and Däumig decided to boycott the Central Council election.8 This
6 Broué. The German Revolution, p.183.
7 Broué. The German Revolution, pp.184-5.
8 Broué. The German Revolution, pp.185-195, Ryder, The German Revolution, pp.165-
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gave Ebert free rein: the boycott meant that all conciliar power, formerly in
the hands of the mixed members Berlin Executive, was now in the hands of
the SPD.
3 Seeds of counterrevolution
The abstentionism of the revolutionary left gave Ebert enough elbow room
to reconcile himself to the budding counterrevolution, whose seeds were sown
by the Army High Command’s decision to create a border volunteer corps.
Ostensibly, the volunteer corps was meant to protect Germany’s eastern bor-
der; effectively, it was meant to to suppress the councils. Wilhelm Groener,
the Quartermaster-General of the German army, set this plan in motion on
23 November 1918. His volunteer force was to be a forerunner to the Free
Corps, later used by the SPD leadership to break the revolution. In the
beginning, Ebert was probably unaware of the border-force ploy.9 There is
plenty of evidence, however, that he entered into a pact with Groener on 10
November, without informing the Provisional Government or the Berlin Ex-
ecutive.10 The pact provided recognition to the old imperial army structures,
in return for safe return of all troops and an agreement to abide by the rules
set out by the new government. Ebert had invited cannibals to dinner.
Ebert’s reconciliation with militarism was avoidable: between November
1918 and January 1919, there were at least three attempts to democratise the
army. On 12 November the Executive Council issued a decree for the creation
of a Red Army. It was rescinded two days later, following vocal opposition
by the soldiers’ councils. On 15 November the Executive issued another
decree, calling for the subordination of the Army High Command to the War
Ministry. It was never enforced. On 3 December Ebert put forward a plan
to create a popular militia (Volkswehr). According to the historian Ulrich
Kluge,11 the idea was greeted enthusiastically by the councils; it also found
adherents in the Prussian War Ministry. However, stalwart resistance by the
higher echelons of the administration, including by high-ranking officers, led
183
9 Holger Herwig, ‘The First German Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils and
the Problem of Military Reforms’. Central European History 1 (1968), pp.150-165, pp.
154-55.
10 Ryder, The German Revolution, pp.161-2
11 Ulrich Kluge, Die deutsche Revolution 1918, 1919 (Berlin, Suhrkamp, 1985).
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to the abandonment of the plan on 28 December. By that time, the cannibals
were already consolidating their positions of power, preparing to feast on the
revolution’s flesh. The feast began in early 1919, with the Free Corps’ bloody
suppression of the Spartacist uprising; it received the stamp of legality in the
Reichswehr Law of March 1919; it took a bite at state power in the Kapp
putsch of 1920; another bite in the Beer Hall putsch of 1923; it swallowed
Germany whole in 1933.
Now, the fact that Ebert mooted the Volkswehr idea in early December
suggests that he had reservations. But his vaccilations were over well before
28 December. On 20 December, the newly-elected Central Council joined
the Provisional Government in a meeting with Groener. Groener attacked
the Hamburg points in favour of democratisation of the army, citing Entente
pressure and army integrity as prime concerns. He then demanded that
implementation of the points be postponed indefinitely. Ebert sided with
Groener. Under the pretext that the Hamburg points provided merely ‘gen-
eral guidelines’—a suggestion explicitly rejected by the council congress, two
days earlier—Ebert exempted a large part of the army from their conditions.
Having accepted Groener’s RSVP, Ebert openly defied the councils.
In the meantime, the left wing of the USPD, following the Russian play-
book, had turned the councils-vs-parliament issue into the centrepiece of their
politics. On 16 December, Däumig complained that the council congress was
turning itself into a ‘political suicide club’. By supporting the convocation
of a National Assembly and, subsequently, by surrendering its veto on gov-
ernment policy, it was opting for self-abolition. Däumig was right about the
suicide, but wrong about its instigator. For it was the USPD leftists them-
selves who fired the killing shot. To be sure, Ebert and Scheidemann had put
a gun to the head of the councils. But, in boycotting the elections to the Cen-
tral Council, the USPD helped them pull the trigger. During the Congress,
Ebert had conceded that the implementation of the Hamburg points would
be supervised by the Provisional Government in conjunction with the Cen-
tral Council. Had the USPD participated in the Council election, it would
have had another foot in the 20 December meeting with Groener. It would
thereby have been better able to resist Ebert’s pact with militarism. At the
very least, the USPD would have been able to openly expose Ebert’s dis-
regard for a unanimous Congress decision and demand his resignation. In
connection with that fateful meeting, the historian Holger Herwig observed:
The only serious opposition to Groener’s statements came from
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Haase, Dittmann, and Barth (the three USPD members of the
Provisional Government). The full import of the USPD’s refusal
to participate in the elections for the Central Council was now
revealed.12
Instead of buttressing the Central Council, the USPD boycotted it, but
stayed in the Provisional Government until 24 December 1918. By that time,
a farcical coup attempt by a group of disgruntled army officers,13 perpetrated
on 6 December, had set in train events leading to the slaughter of thirty sailors
by the army. The representatives of the USPD in the government, Dittman,
Haase, and Barth, resigned in protest.
Council Erfurtianism—democratic parliamentarism plus worker control—
was therefore undermined by the SPD leadership, with some help from the
USPD left. Its spirit survived in the consciousness of the German workers and
their calls for socialist unity. Even in late December, this spirit was not lost
on Luxemburg and Liebknecht. As the Bolshevik Karl Radek put it, ‘The
congress of councils itself was in favour of the constituent assembly. You
could hardly skip over that stage. Rosa and Liebknecht recognized that and
Tyszka [Leo Jogiches] insisted on it.’14 Radek appreciated that the German
revolution differed from the Russian in that the former had its Erfurtian
moment. But he mistook that moment for a mere ‘stage’. The mistake
consists in thinking that the relationship between democracy and communism
is purely instrumental: you board the democratic train, disembarking when
you get to communism. In that belief he differed, not only from Luxemburg,
but also from the vast majority of the German workers. The workers were
right; democracy was both part of the journey and the main value-conferring
feature of the destination. The rest of this essay discusses the democratic
road to communism and why it was not taken by 1918 Germany.
4 Rosenberg’s gambit
The revolutionary wildfire of early November had won Germany three months;
three months to rekindle the democratic aspirations of 1848; three months
12 Herwig ‘The First German Congress’, p.162.
13 Herwig ‘The First German Congress’, p.156; Arthur Rosenberg, A History of the
German Republic (London, Methuen, 1936), chapter 1.
14 Radek cited in John Riddell. The German Revolution and the Debate on Soviet
Power. (London, Pathfinder Press, 1999), p.231, emphasis added.
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to burn the deadwood of militarism. By January 1919, it transpired that the
SPD leadership had fallen way short of fulfilling either of these tasks. This
section explains how it fell short; it then sketches an alternative revolutionary
strategy that could have won.
The litany of leftist complaints against the SPD leadership is well-known:
as early as 9 November, Ebert called on the whole administrative apparatus
of imperial Germany, including reactionary state officials, to remain in their
posts; on 10 November he opposed the republic and aimed to restore the
monarchy; on the same day, he entered into the pact with Groener and ma-
nipulated President Wilson’s offer of food to discourage strikes. Throughout
November and December he delayed the socialisation of industry; he openly
defied the councils; and on 20 December he supported Groener against the
Hamburg points... The list goes on. But the question remains: how could
the revolution have done away with the SPD leadership, while implementing
the two immediate tasks of the revolution, anti-militarism and socialisation?
An influential answer has been provided by the German historian Arthur
Rosenberg, one of the revolution’s active participants.
According to Rosenberg, the leaders of the USPD Right, Haase and
Dittman, ‘represented the decisively important central and moderate opinion
among the Socialist working class that embraced millions of the proletariat.
The fate of the German Revolution might depend on whether this tendency
was put into action or not.’15 Putting the tendency into action, for Rosen-
berg, meant splitting the USPD, rejoining the SPD, and carrying ‘a consid-
erable part of the USPD’ with them. Writing in 1936, Rosenberg argued
that this move could have ‘counterbalanced’ the policy of Ebert and Schei-
demann, indeed might have forced them to resign. Naturally, the best time
to do this would have been 18 December 1918, when the USPD left decided
to boycott the Central Council elections. It tells in favour of Rosenberg’s
retrospectively considered strategy, moreover, that it would have confronted
the shop stewards with a decision: side with council Erfurtianism, or side
with the Spartacus League, which had been overrun by putschist fanatics.
Let me explain.
On 30 December 1918 the Spartacus League split from the USPD to form
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). Participation in the National As-
sembly election was discussed on the same day. After a heated debate, in
which Luxemburg and Liebknecht mustered all their political and rhetorical
15 Rosenberg, A History, p.59
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skills to avert a boycott of the assembly elections. The KPD nevertheless
voted to boycott the election by 62 votes to 33. Looking back, Rosenberg
commented: ‘Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were faced with the same
decision as Dittman and Haase. . . whether they would appear as supporters
of the policy which they believed to be the only right one, or whether they
would be loyal to an out-of-date Party organization.’16 Like Dittman and
Haase, Luxemburg and Liebknecht opted for ‘an out-of-date Party organi-
zation’, in the sense of it being unsynchronised with the exigencies of the
situation. In the case of Germany, it would seem, history repeats itself first
as tragedy and then as tragedy.
In this context, the shop stewards and the Spartacists were not natural
bedfellows. During their early January discussions about joining the KPD,
the shop stewards demanded that the latter rescind the decision to boycott
the election; that tactics and strategy be decided jointly between Sparta-
cus and shop stewards; and that the term ‘Spartacus’ be removed from the
new party name. The negotiations came to nothing.17 Rosenberg therefore
rightly lamented that the USPD Right did not force that disagreement ear-
lier: a USPD split in early December might have meant earlier negotiations
between shop stewards and Spartacus, earlier stalemate, and earlier home-
coming to a more left-leaning, more council-oriented SPD. In any event, the
Comintern adopted its sectarian policy of the twenty-one points in 1920; that
policy choked any semblance of democracy out of the KPD and eventually
turned it into an instrument of Russian foreign policy. This provides further
retrospective justification for splitting the USPD well before Zinoviev’s siren
call to the USPD left in October 1920.
Could council Erfurtianism have succeeded? As I will argue presently,
Rosenberg’s speculations were plausible; they sketched a trajectory of polit-
ical possibility from late 1918 to late 1920. Historical reality, however, was
much more grim. Ebert’s dismissal, in early January 1919, of Emil Eich-
horn, the Berlin Chief of Police and central figure in the November events,
led to mass demonstrations. On 5 January, Spartacists occupied the Berlin
headquarters of Vorwärts, the SPD paper. Over the next few days, Gustav
Noske, Ebert’s newly-appointed minister, unleashed the Berlin Free Corps on
the Spartacists. Liebknecht and Luxemburg were murdered on 15 January.
16 Rosenberg, A History, p.71
17 See Riddell, The German Revolution, section 4.
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5 Neither Weimar nor Petrograd
Council Erfurtianism, the strategy mooted by Kautsky in the early days of
the revolution and retrospectively championed by Rosenberg, rejected both
Weimar and Petrograd; both the primacy of parliament and the primacy
of councils. The idea was taken up in the 1960s by Oertzen, Rürup, and
other council historians keen to imagine revolutionary paths not leading to
either Auschwitz or the gulag.18 The rest of this essay discusses how council
Erfurtianism might have saved the German revolution.
In December 1918, Kautsky argued for the institutionalisation of dual
power between the National Assembly and the workers’ councils, each per-
forming different roles: roughly, parliament would control the state, councils
would control the factories.19 Kautsky’s rebuttals to critics of this model
were cogent and significant;20 his proposal for carrying it out, however, was
incoherent. Let me explain.
According to Kautsky, left critics of the dual power model made two
claims: that allowing political parliaments tilts the preponderance of votes
in favour of capitalists, and that such parliaments are talking shops.21 Kaut-
sky pointed out that the exclusion of capitalists from the suffrage reduces
the electorate by one percent or less, which is numerically negligible. He
then alluded sardonically to a Spartacist who spoke long and hard—very
long and very hard!—against tolerating a talking shop, in the form of the
Constituent Assembly. Kautsky concluded that the objection against par-
liamentary democracy can be neither that capitalists have numbers nor that
parliaments are talking shops. Rather, the problem is the capitalists’ power
and influence, which derives from their control over the factories. So the solu-
tion is effective and comprehensive socialisation of the means of production.
But this is precisely where the problems start.
18 Reinhard Rürup, Probleme der Revolution in Deutschland 1918/1919 (Wies-
baden, Institut für Europäische Geschichte. Vorträge. No. 50, 1968); Peter von Oertzen,
Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution. (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1963).
19 A similar model of parliamentary dyarchy was proposed by Beatrice and Sidney
Webb in their A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (London,
Longmans, 1920). The impeccable socialist credentials of that proposal are vindicated by
two facts: that it never references Marx, Engels, or Kautsky, and that it opens with a
defence of the British monarchy!
20 See Riddell, The German Revolution, pp.130-145
21 Karl Kautsky, ‘National assembly and council assembly’, in Riddell, The German
Revolution, pp.130-145.
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In early December 1918, following strong pressure from below, Ebert ap-
pointed Kautsky and Rudolf Hilferding to a Socialisation Commission. The
Commission was a diversionary tactic; Ebert’s real aim was to appease pop-
ular demands for industrial democracy, without exacting meaningful conces-
sions from the German capitalists.22 Kautsky’s Commission envisaged two
policies: a gradual socialisation of industry, beginning with coal, iron and
steel, eventually expanding to the whole industrial sector. But it also, and
simultaneously, assigned a subordinate political role to the councils, their sole
task being to ensure that parliament constantly heard the voice of the work-
ers in their class organisation.23 The latter strategy of council subordination
rendered Kautsky’s socialisation programme incoherent.
Socialisation requires a solid, vibrant, and self-confident extra-parliamentary
workers’ movement. This confidence can only be sustained by assigning a per-
manent role to those in whose name and interest socialisation is carried out.
Kautsky knew that this kind of pressure would not issue from parliament,
party, or union; its sole source was the councils. It followed that even a
gradualist socialisation programme required an institutionalised council sys-
tem to exert pressure from below. Yet he assumed that the councils should
acquiesce in their subordinate political role and eventual self-abolition. This,
it turned out, was hardly the road to power.
At the end of 1918, Kautsky’s Commission issued a preliminary state-
ment, recommending the socialisation of highly monopolized industries, such
as coal and iron.24 At the same time, the Berlin council congress agitated
for socialisation of ‘appropriate’ industries, with emphasis on mining. In the
grip of this revolutionary fervour, workers’ councils all over Germany set up
boards with the aim of taking control of local mines. The January 1919
election upset these initiatives. The two socialist parties garnered 45 percent
of the vote; the SPD joined a coalition with middle-class parties. After a
wave of strikes—and the repression of the Spartacist uprising—the German
workers managed to force a watered-down system of co-determination for a
limited number of industries. No part of Kautsky’s socialisation plan was
implemented, with the exception of the coal industry. Coal was nationalised
under the aegis of a National Coal Council, composed of state officials, work-
22 Ryder, The German Revolution, pp.18-9; Broué. The German Revolution, pp.169-70.
23 Kautsky, ‘National assembly and council assembly’, pp.153-4.
24 See especially Karl Korsch, Revolutionary Theory. In Douglas Kellner (ed.). (Uni-
versity of Texas Press, Austin 1977) and Karl Korsch, ‘What is Socialisation?’, Frankie
Denton and Douglas Kellner (trans.). New German Critique, 6 (1975), pp.60-81.
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ers, consumers, and bosses. The reticence of the SPD leadership in respect
of socialisation, coupled with its neglect of the councils, had reinstated the
pre-war capitalist oligarchy.
6 Adler’s solution
Kautsky was right about principles, but wrong about strategy. Max Adler,
the Austro-Marxist philosopher, provided a more clear-headed strategic vi-
sion. Where Kautsky thought of parliament as central to the revolution
and councils as peripheral, Adler thought the reverse. Adler’s idea was sim-
ple, and invoked Engels’ notion of the withering away of the state: as more
and more tasks get performed by the councils, returning democratic self-
government to those directly subjected to political decisions, state and par-
liament become increasingly superfluous. For Adler, the dictatorship of the
proletariat is a process of gradual democratic re-appropriation of workplace,
state and market, by the actors directly subjected to their workings.25
Adler developed these ideas in the midst of the Austrian revolution, which
broke out on 30 October 30 1918. Broadly speaking, the Austrian revolution
was the German revolution in slow motion: Germany’s three crucial months,
November 1918 to January 1919, stretched out across two years. As in Ger-
many, the collapse of the old imperial structures—in this case, the Habsburg
empire—led to the creation of workers’ and soldiers’ councils. These featured
the pyramid-like federal structure of the German councils and enjoyed wide
popular support. The National Council of workers’ and soldiers’ councils,
Austria’s equivalent of the Central Council, was a powerful political agent
from the autumn of 1918 to the spring of 1919.
Max Adler thought it possible to sustainably combine the existence of the
National Council with the parliament, in a system of constitutionally-defined
dual power. The Council was to deal with investment planning, finance and
socialisation; it was also to have veto power over all decrees brought forward
by the parliament. At the same time, the councils would agitate for social-
ist majority in parliament, which would, in due course, produce a worker-led
government. The resulting dual majority would begin the devolution of power
25 Max Adler, Demokratie und Rätesystem. (Verlag der Wiener Volksbuch, Vienna
1919). Adler was one of the left leaders of the Social Democratic Worker’s Party of Austria
(SDAPÖ) at the time of the Austrian Revolution of 1918-19.
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to working people and, from there, initiate the withering away of the state.26
The Austrian revolution did not, however, conform to Adler’s choreography.
Rather, its choreographer-in-chief was Otto Bauer—the Austrian Kautsky.
Bauer was secretary of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Austria
(SDAPÖ) from 1907 and 1914 and one of its main theoreticians. He was also
a member of the first post-war Austrian coalition government and chaired
its Socialisation Commission from 1918 to 1920. Bauer agreed with Kautsky
that socialisation should be the outcome of a nonviolent, gradual process of
appropriation of the means of production; in early 1919, he drew up a plan
to nationalise steel, iron, coal, and electricity, which was never implemented.
The set of Bauer’s proposals that did make it into law—extension of unem-
ployment insurance, an eight-hour working day, the creation of codetermi-
nation for firms with twenty employees or more—never threatened capitalist
private property.
It is relevant, in this connection, that Bauer followed Kautsky, in assigning
minor and conjunctural significance to the councils. Despite, and because
of, this neglect, the Austrian councils survived until late 1920, when they
got absorbed by the trade unions. Adler repeatedly admonished Bauer and
the SDAPÖ leadership for that neglect: he thought that, unless they were
insulated from union and party bureaucracies, the councils would dissolve or
be absorbed into obscurity. And so they were. It was Adler, not Bauer or
Kautsky, who offered the most prescient defence of council Erfurtianism.
In Terrorism and Communism, Trotsky disparaged council Erfurtianism,
at once mocking Kautsky’s ‘pedantry and scholasticism’, as well as Adler’s
‘erudite impotence’.27 He argues that institutionalised dual power is unde-
sirable and unfeasible, except as a transitional policy. Undesirable, because
the separation of powers between councils and parliaments is merely the
resultant of class forces: in the case of the councils, the power of the prole-
tariat, and in the case of liberal parliaments, the power of the bourgeoisie.
It follows that proletarian dictatorship must eventually do away with parlia-
ments. The dual power arrangement is also unfeasible, because inherently
unstable: eventually power must fall into the hands of one class. Therefore
the only sustainable expression of proletarian rule inevitably does away with
parliaments.
26 Adler, Demokratie und Rätesystem, chapter 7.
27 Leon Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism (New York, Workers’ Liberty Library,
1922), pp. 191-192.
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Trotsky’s argument is multiply confused. For one, democratic parlia-
ments are perfectly compatible with proletarian dictatorship—just as they
are with bourgeois dictatorship. Indeed, proletarian rule presupposes such
parliaments, for it presupposes those liberties that feed the revolutionary fire,
including freedom to speak and criticise the revolutionary leadership. The
purpose of communist revolution, after all, is to abolish all manner of ruling
class, not to install a new one. Trotsky’s instability argument, moreover, is
irrelevant: it took decades—sometimes centuries—for the separation of pow-
ers to find stable expression in bourgeois democracies. Why should things be
any different in socialist democracies?
7 Roads not taken
Despite these obvious strictures, which told against council dictatorship, the
USPD Left insisted that the National Assembly was the counterrevolution.
It followed, in the words of Däumig, that ‘the National Assembly means
the councils’ death’.28 Both premise and conclusion were false. For the
revolution’s twin tasks, anti-militarism and socialisation, were still within
reach after the election of January 1919. And since these tasks would have
preserved the councils—in the form of worker control of industry—Däumig’s
conclusion was false. This section discusses how the revolution’s twin tasks
could have been implemented, from early 1919 to the summer of 1920.
In respect of anti-militarism, success depended on who controlled the
army and its composition. During the febrile first half of 1919, Noske de-
cided to use former imperial officers, who held themselves accountable to
Hindenburg and the Hohenzollerns. By contrast, a reunited, council-friendly
SPD could have rid itself of Ebert, Scheidemann, and Noske; it could have
trusted the tens of thousands of democratic army volunteers and members
of soldiers’ councils throughout Germany. Only council Erfurtianism could
have achieved such a recruitment drive. In respect of the socialisation task,
success depended on inroads against private property. The Stinnes-Legien
agreement of 15 November 1918—between the bosses’ boss, Hugo Stinnes,
and the union leader Carl Legien—recognised trade unions, established an
eight-hour working day, and ushered in ‘co-determination’ for workplaces of
fifty employees or more. In return, the unions agreed to leave production
28 Ernst Däumig, ‘The National Assembly Means the Councils’ Death’, in Gabriel Kuhn,
All Power to the Councils! (Oakland, PM Press, 2012), pp.40-50.
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in the hands of the capitalists and to moderate their socialisation demands.
Again: a reunited, council-friendly SPD would have made further inroads
against capital than Legien demanded or Stinnes allowed, by extending the
ambit of council power beyond union-sanctioned territory. Only council Er-
furtianism could have achieved socialisation through workers’ control.
These counterfactuals might seem wildly speculative. They are not: they
describe visibly accessible revolutionary roads that could easily have been
taken in 1919 and 1920. Consider two concrete examples.
Following the January 1919 election, the SPD joined a coalition with the
middle-class parties. Council Erfurtianism continued to vegetate pleasantly
among working-class supporters of the two socialist parties. In February
1919, Hilferding presented a proposal for institutionalizing the councils, giv-
ing them the right to bring bills before the National Assembly and to call
a referendum if the Assembly rejected them. One month later, his proposal
became official USPD policy, as part of its ‘Revolutionary Programme’. In
theory, the institutionalization of the councils could reignite working-class ag-
itation from below; it would also lend grassroots support to any attempted
decapitation of the SPD leadership—now under Scheidemann—should the
opportunity arise.
The opportunity did arise. In March 1919 there was a general strike in
Berlin. The revived Central Council of Berlin raised the old Erfurtian flag:
it called for a SPD-USPD coalition without Scheidemann. The strike was a
perfect avenue for diverting picket traffic into council militancy; all it required
was socialist unity. However, reticence and vacillation from the USPD Left,
combined with lack of leadership on the USPD Right, allowed the SPD-led
government to regain control of the strike. Something similar happened in
June. The SPD’s constant concessions to the middle-class parties forced it
to look left, to its traditional working-class constituencies; its party congress
offered to enter into negotiations with the USPD, in return for an official
renunciation of putschism. The offer was, again, blocked by the USPD Left.
Ralf Hoffrogge has recently emphasised the significance of the March 1919
strikes, whose defeat, he argues, meant the defeat of the November Revolu-
tion. According to Hoffrogge, the March strikes contrasted with both the
Spartacist uprising and the short-lived council republics of 1919,29 in that ‘a
broad movement from the centre of the working class came together to shift
29 The Bavarian and Bremen Council Republics of 1919 survived for 27 and 25 days,
respectively.
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the revolution’s direction one more time—and failed.’ What Germany got, in-
stead, was ‘cooperation between business owners and workers—corporatism,
instead of socialism.’ Hoffrogge thinks that the idea which ‘animated rev-
olutionary workers in 1919’, including many of the strikers, was the ‘pure
council system’ of Däumig and Müller. This idea, he claims, ‘grew into a
real, though ultimately failed mass movement’.30
Hoffrogge is right that 1919 Germany got corporatism instead of social-
ism. But if he is also right that the March strikes brought together the ‘centre
of the working class’, then it could not have been ‘animated’ by the ‘pure
council system’, for few socialists advocated pure council rule. Indeed, those
of them who read Die Freiheit—the official USPD paper—would have been
familiar with Kautsky’s arguments against pure council rule, largely unad-
dressed by Däumig and Müller. Hoffrogge is right, moreover, that the March
strikers’ ‘biggest source of discontent was the government’s foot-dragging on
socialisation policy’. But now it surely follows that most strikers were not
proponents of the pure council system, for, by Hoffrogge’s own admission,
most socialist proponents of socialisation remained committed to the idea of
parliamentary democracy. The only way the USPD could have squared this
particular circle was parliamentary democracy plus councils—that is, council
Erfurtianism.
Hoffrogge’s discussion of the March strikes resonates with the old Leninist
idea that the main explanation of their failure was lack of centralized lead-
ership.31 He writes, for example, that ‘the revolution had no organizational
centre and no armed force to defend it’. But, pace Hoffrogge, the revolution
did have a centre: the USPD, whose membership tripled between Decem-
ber 1918 and March 1919 (from 100,000 to 300,000 members),32 was the
revolution’s de facto leadership. The basis of that leadership was council Er-
furtianism; Hilferding’s ‘Revolutionary Programme’ was its set of transitional
demands. The pure council system was therefore hardly the only revolution-
ary strategy available to the March strikers. And if Kolb, Rosenberg, and
Oertzen are to be believed, that strategy remained distinctly unattractive to
30 Ralf Hoffrogge, ‘The German Revolution’s Bloody End’. Jacobin. 16.3.19.
(https://jacobinmag.com/2019/03/german-revolution-1919-strikes-uprising-democracy)
31 See Chris Harman, The Lost Revolution (London, Haymarket Books, 2017), for an
expression of that view.
32 Dan Morrill, ‘The Comintern and the German Independent Social Democratic Party’,
The Historian 32 (1970), pp.191-209, p.196, who also discusses the contemporaneous dis-
array within the ranks of the KPD.
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the majority of the strikers, when compared to council Erfurtianism.
The fate of council Erfurtianism was sealed one year after the March
strikes. In early 1920, the Weimar Assembly debated a ‘works councils’ bill.
The bill was a watered-down version of employer-employee ‘co-determination’,
assigning a minor and insignificant role to the workers’ councils. Both USPD
and KPD opposed it. A demonstration and strike was called for 13 January
1920, which took place outside the Reichstag. When a shot was fired—
allegedly from the demonstrators’ side—troops fired back, killing a number
of strikers. Weeks of recriminations followed. The Army High Command,
now headed by Walther von Lüttwitz, saw this as an opportunity to restore
the old order. On 13 March 1920, Lüttwitz and Wolfgang Kapp, a monar-
chist parliamentarian, marched into Berlin. They were accompanied by the
swastika-clad soldiers of the Ehrhardt Brigade, a Free Corps group profess-
ing allegiance to Ludendorff and the empire. Kapp’s chancellorship lasted
for four days. On 14 March the unions and all the left-wing parties of Ger-
many called for a general strike. Some twelve million workers heeded the
call, bringing the country to a standstill. The putsch collapsed on 17 March,
and fresh elections were called for 6 June 1920.
The Kapp putsch strike was—still is—the most successful strike in Ger-
man labour history. Worker militancy and discontent were once again on
the rise; the strike therefore cleared another path for council Erfurtianism.
This time, the Erfurtian flag was raised by Legien, the trade union leader.
He called for a ‘pure labour government’ between the two socialist parties.33
This was an opportunity to sideline the old SPD leadership and revive the
revolution’s twin tasks of anti-militarism and socialisation. The USPD left
once more opposed the call. This set in train a familiar chain of events: the
SPD turned to the middle-class parties, which demanded ‘law and order’,
which meant violent repression of the radicalized, anti-Kapp insurrections in
Saxony, Thuringia, and the Ruhr. Repression, in turn, pushed the SPD into
renewed wedlock with militarism.
The final blow was struck at the elections of June 1920. Blaming the so-
cialist parties for all the evils that militarism and the Entente had showered
upon them, the voters turned to the middle-class parties. The new Chan-
cellor, a member of the catholic Centre Party, solemnly renewed his govern-
ment’s vows to militarism; the capitalists were happy to act as groomsmen.
33 Morgan Philips Price, Dispatches from the Weimar Republic (London, Pluto Press,
1999), p.197; Ryder, The German Revolution, pp.242-3.
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The German revolution was spent.
Conclusion
The revolution’s ambit of possibility was severely circumscribed by the in-
fluence of two pivotal figures in modern German political history: Bismarck
and Kautsky. Bismarck had destroyed German liberalism and instilled mil-
itarism into German capitalism, thereby forcing social democracy to shoul-
der the tasks of both bourgeois and proletarian revolution. Kautsky, on the
other hand, rubber-stamped the idea that parliamentarism leads to socialism
into the soul of German social democracy, thereby leading socialists to for-
sake extra-parliamentary institutions—the councils—when they were needed
most. Council Erfurtianism was the only revolutionary strategy that folded
these distinct tasks, parliamentarism and worker control, into one coherent
political programme. By the summer of 1920, that strategy had been crushed
between a resurgent militarism and a diffident reformism. Its shattered rem-
nants formed the frail foundations of the Weimar Republic.
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